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The Exit Rates of 
Liquidated Venture Capital Funds




Helsinki School of Economics
Exit rates provide a simple yet practical measure for evaluating and benchmarking the 
performance of venture capital funds. We create a sample of 138 liquidated U.S. venture 
capital funds and investigate the outcomes of their 4,549 portfolio companies. We study exit 
rates, proportions of different exit routes, and their determinants. The median fiind in our 
sample exited 19% of portfolio companies through an IPO, 7% through a sale of listed 
equity, and 23% through mergers or acquisitions. There exist, however, interesting 
differences between fimd types: Li particular, large funds and fund management firms have 
significantly higher exit rates.
Introduction
What are the cross-sectional determinants of venture capitalist success? Institutional 
investors participating in venture capital funds have a significant interest in the answer, as it
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may help them decide which fund to choose. Research into cross-sectional differences and 
determinants of success is, however, made difficult by the scarcity of publicly available data 
on fund-specific returns. Consequently, new approaches are of interest in examining the 
comparative capabilities of venture capitalists.
Prior research on venture capital performance concentrates on the risk and return 
profiles of venture capital investments over time, and on comparisons with other asset 
classes such as stocks and bonds. ^  There is evidence that venture capital investments have, 
on average, yielded higher returns than investments in the public equity markets (see e.g. 
Cochrane, 2004), but significant differences exist within the asset class. Other studies, such 
as Martin and Petty (1983), Ibbotson and Brinson (1987), and Kleiman and Schulman 
(1992) look at the stock prices of publicly traded venture capital firms. Finally, on the 
practitioner side, the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) reports average rates of 
return on a regular basis. Performance by industry, region, across time, and other 
classifications is reported annually in the publications of NVCA.
The existing literature reveals three areas in which information is scarce. First, there 
exists limited research on the determinants of venture capital success. Second, the exit rates 
of venture capital investments have been relatively little studied: Schwienbacher (2002) 
shows results from a survey, while Cumming (2002) studies a sample of 17 European funds. 
Measures of exit rates are interesting not only as a proxy of investment success; they also 
have value to practitioners as they evaluate whether their investment memoranda are 
realistic. Is it, for example, reasonable for a venture capitalist to expect in its internal 
documentation that 50% of its investments will exit successfully, even if the median for 
similar funds is only 30%? Third, there appears to be a need for further research into 
liquidated funds, where future uncertainty no longer clouds the results. This has only 
become feasible in recent years.
This study looks at 138 U.S. based venture capital funds liquidated between 1990 
and 2000 and investigates the ultimate disposition of each of their approximately 4,500 
portfolio companies. Using this new dataset, we examine the proportion of successful exits 
to portfolio companies for each fund and investigate variables affecting this measure. We 
also study the proportion of different exit modes and show data on four different types of 
exits: 1. initial public offering only, 2. sale of listed equity (i.e. initial public offering 
followed by a merger or acquisition), 3. merger or acquisition only, and 4. M&A transaction 
followed by a stock market listing. Breakdowns and analyses of these measures allow 
practitioners to evaluate the realism of their currently planned exit strategy.
We examine several testable hypotheses regarding exit rates and the characteristics 
of venture capital funds. The exit rate may be affected by such factors as the size and 
portfolio composition of the fund, including industry preferences or a focus on early or late 
stage investments. Independent, banking, or corporate venture capital flinds^ may have 
different exit behavior based on differing incentive structures. We also study the evidence 
on learning effects among sequel funds: We define a sequel fund to be any fund that is not 
the first raised by a given fund management company. Finally, timing may be a significant 
factor: luck and market movements could be as relevant as managerial success or 
organization design.
Using the proportion of successful exits as dependent variable, we find that large 
fimds have significantly higher exit rates. This holds for measures of both fund size and firm
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capital under management. The larger fund management companies are presumably also the 
more established and reputable ones, and may capitalize on their reputation through 
certification as described in Megginson and Weiss (1991) for the IPO market. We 
investigate separately the possibility that the results are driven IPO market timing ability 
through a two-stage analysis controlling for the effects on all variables of a measure of IPO 
market timing: this does not change our results significantly.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the importance and 
profitability of various exit types to venture capitalists. Section II develops hypotheses as to 
variables likely to affect the exit rates and routes of a particular fund. Section III discusses 
the data used and the measurement of variables, while section IV describes the results 
obtained. Section V concludes.
I. The Choice of Exit Mode
The investment performance of venture capital funds is driven by successful exits. 
There are several potential acquirers for the equity of a portfolio company. These include, 
most importantly, the investing public via the stock market, companies in the same or 
related industries as the portfolio company, other institutional investors, and, finally, the 
company or entrepreneur itself.
The public stock markets are often, though not always, the first choice. Black and 
Gilson (1999) state that U.S. venture capital funds earn an average 60% annual return on 
investment in IPO exits, compared to 15% in acquisition exits. Sahlman (1990) docimients 
that almost all of the returns to investors in venture capital are earned by companies that 
eventually go public, while Barry (1994) concludes that IPOs appear to be the most 
profitable way of exit.
However, alternatives to IPOs are certainly not trivial in frequency or importance 
(see Black and Gilson, 1998). Robb (2002) points out that an IPO is a feasible alternative 
for only few small businesses. Schwienbacher (2002) reports the following exit frequencies 
from a survey of 67 U.S. funds; IPO (+ sale of quoted equity) 29.9%, trade sale / acquisition 
30.3%, management buyout 2.0%, secondary sale / refinancing 5.0%, and fmally liquidation 
(write-off), 32.8%.
Venture capitalists may rely on the IPO markets to a widely different extent 
depending on their strategy. Advantages of a non-IPO exit could be related to greater 
privacy or lesser external pressure on operating performance. Another disadvantage of an 
IPO exit may be that they often provide less immediate liquidity than most trade sales: a 
trade sale of a 100% stake liberates capital immediately, while only a part of the company is 
sold in an IPO^.
The second common alternative is an acquisition of the portfolio company by a firm 
in the same or a related industry, i.e. a trade sale. This alternative provides a great deal of 
different options as to the amount of stake sold, the consideration received (cash or stock), 
and the formulation of the sales and purchase agreement. Earn-out conditions (i.e. tying the 
transaction value to future financial performance) or strict formulations of the 
representations and warranties clauses may, in effect, make the payment received by the 
fund contingent on a number of future events.
An alternative type of buyer consists of financial investors such as other venture 
capitalist firms. Finding a second venture capitalist willing to buy the portfolio company at a 
reasonable price is not always obvious. Why should they see potential in a company their
 ^ Dubil (2002) models the optimal liquidation behavior of venture capitalists faced with a sale of concentrated 
security holdings.
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competitor is already trying to exit, unless their views are widely divergent?
The company, entrepreneur, or management group of the company is the final 
typical buyer. Such a transaction may happen in the context of a management buy-out from 
&e venture capitalist. Alternatively, the transaction can be embedded in the original 
investment contract in the form of put or call options.
Can we then use exit rates as a proxy for investment success? Exits will differ 
widely in their terms and the price obtained. We should certainly be careful in making 
inferences based on, say, the IPO exit rate only. Although IPOs have often been a high profit 
exit method, there may be characteristics of the portfolio compames or market situations in 
which a particular fund would find other exit methods more optimal.
The total rate of successful exits, however, while not a perfect proxy for 
performance, presents fewer problems. We can in most cases safely assume that a venture 
capitalist will prefer almost any kind of exit to liquidation. The exit rate can mostly be more 
clearly observed from the outside than the actual cash flows of the fund. In contrast, the 
calculation of performance through internal rates of return (IRR) is tricky in terms of both 
data availability and measurement problems. As an example of the latter, in IPO exits, 
venture capitalists typically keep a large stake for a certain period after the IPO and exit 
piece by piece (see Gumming and Macintosh, 2003, for partial exits). The difficult part for 
an outside observer would be to track all the actual cash flows the venture capitalist receives 
from selling portions of its ownership after the IPO.
II. Determinants of the exit rate
This section discusses a number of possible determinants of exit rates. The 
determinants are divided into five categories: Compensation and incentives, learning and 
experience, portfolio size, portfolio composition, and timing.
A. Compensation and incentives
Like rates of return, compensation schemes in individual venture capital funds are 
not public information. However, prior research discusses a number of issues relating to the 
compensation and incentives of different kinds of venture organizations.
Gompers and Lemer (1999b) study the agreements of 419 U.S. independent venture 
capital partnerships. They note that the agreements typically designate a percentage of the 
fund’s capital or assets as an annual management fee and a percent of profits (i.e. carried 
interest) to be paid out as investment returns are realized. Management fees typically vary 
between 1.5% and 3%. In 81% of the funds, the carried interest is found to be between 20% 
and 21%, and in over 300 funds exactly 20%.
As to captive venture capital funds, the compensation of managers appears not as 
performance based as in independent funds. Gompers and Lemer (1998) note that 
corporations have firequently been reluctant to compensate their venture managers though 
profit-sharing (i.e. carried interest) provisions, fearing that they might need to make overly 
large payments if their investments were successful. Typically, successful risk-taking may 
have been inadequately rewarded and failure excessively punished.
There exist also some differences relating to the fees charged by fimds from 
portfolio companies. According to the classification provided by VentureXpert, a minority 
of funds note that their business model relies only partially on investment success and is 
completed by charging direct fees such as closing fees, service fees, etc from the portfolio 
companies.
Based on this discussion, we suggest two testable hypotheses. First, referring to 
Gompers and Lemer (1998) the compensation stmctures of captive funds run by
corporations or banks are expected to create weaker incentives on average than the carried 
interest systems of independent venture capital funds. We expect to find that captive funds 
have lov^er exit rates than independent funds. Second, we expect funds that charge fees from 
their portfoHo companies to have lower rates of successful exits. This is because their 
financial incentives are less reliant on exits.
B. Learning and experience
If fund managers learn from their experience and improve over time, we would 
expect follow-on funds to perform better than their predecessors. We classify sole funds 
separately, because their performance may be affected by reverse survivorship bias: 
managers of badly performing funds never get an opportunity to raise another fund. Sole 
funds, as well as the first fund in a series, may therefore perform less well and have lower 
exit rates. Less experienced funds may face particular hurdles on the IPO market, where 
they have not yet built a certification reputation as in Megginson and Weiss (1991)
Proximity to information on innovative firms and capital markets may have an 
impact on learning and performance. Smith and Smith (2000) report that a majority of 
venture capital investments were made in Silicon Valley and New England. We expect to 
find that funds operating close to their target companies or in major financial centers should 
perform better on average and have a higher proportion of successful exits.
C. Portfolio size
We examine the capital under management of the fund management company as 
well as the size of an individual fund. These two appear related, but their correlation 
coefficient is only 0.27. We relate management company size primarily to reputation and 
experience, whereas fund size has a link to the universe of investment opportunities 
available.
According to Gompers and Lemer (1999a), the age of the venture capital firm is 
likely to be positively related to its performance through experience and reputation. 
Unfortunately, we have no reliable data on the age or reputation of management firms. We 
test for these effects indirectly. Venture capital firms with a good track record are likely to 
attract more investors and better quality entrepreneurs than newcomers. As a result, a 
venture capital firm’s capital under management is a reasonable proxy for reputation. We 
therefore expect funds managed by larger firms to have longer experience and better 
reputations. They should have a higher proportion of successful exits and are more likely to 
have developed a certification reputation on the IPO market.
Sahlman (1990) documents that venture capitalists’ returns are directly related to the 
size of the fund’s investment portfolio. A possible mechanism explaining this is that larger 
funds are able to make larger individual investments while maintaining sufficient 
diversification. Accordingly, certain large investment opportunities are available only to 
large funds and not to small ones. With a larger universe of investments to choose fi-om, we 
expect the larger funds to find more attractive opportunities resulting in higher rates of 
successful exits. As our variable we choose fund size rather than the number of portfolio 
companies, as the latter is already used in our dependent variable [Successful exits / 
Portfolio companies]. The correlation between ln(fund size) and the number of portfolio 
companies is still 0.55, making it necessary to omit the variable altogether in some 
specifications of the model as a robustness check.
D. Portfolio composition
The venture capital fund’s portfolio composition is likely to affect its exit rate and
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the proportions of different exit routes. Variables to be considered include the fund’s 
investment stage focus and industry focus.
Other things equal, a given start-up company is less likely to succeed and provide 
exit opportunities than a comparable mature company: there are simply more things that can 
still go wrong. Li other words, the likelihood of failure decreases with time as the company 
becomes more mature. As a consequence, we expect to find that the later the stage at which 
the fund typically invests in portfolio companies, the greater the chance of a successful exit.
Funds also have differing industry focuses. We divide the sample into fimds 
focusing on information technology, medical (including biotechnology), or traditional 
industries. The past decade was a time of high technology: Telecommunications and other 
IT companies attracted much of the investors’ interest, particularly in the IPO markets of the 
latter part of the 1990s. We expect flmds concentrating on IT companies to have higher exit 
rates than other industries overall.
E. Timing
A critical issue for the success of a venture capitalist fund is timing. Success can be a 
matter not only of managerial skill and organizational ability, but also of plain luck. The exit 
markets are heavily cyclical, and the IPO market extremely so. A fimd maturing in a good 
IPO year will find its exit plans much simpler to implement. We expect that funds which 
have exited during years of high IPO activity have had the highest exit rates, and use 
measures of market activity as control variables. Additionally, we perform a two-stage 
analysis in which the effects of an IPO timing factor are first taken out.
We also study the effects of fund lifetime. The expected effect is that funds with a 
longer lifetime have more exits, as they have self-selected to wait longer for a favorable IPO 
market. This is not necessarily optimal, however, as a longer investment period puts 
pressure on IRR.
ni. Data and variables
The data used in the study are collected from SDC VentureXpert, New Issues and 
M&A databases. VentureXpert (provided by Venture Economics) provides data on venture 
capital and private equity worldwide from 1970 to present. So far, numerous venture capital 
related studies have used data from VentureXpertA^enture Economics (see. e.g. Bygrave et 
al., 1989; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Gompers and Lemer, 1998, 1999b). New Issues 
includes information on all types of equity and debt issues worldwide from 1962 to date, 
while the M&A database goes back to 1979 for U.S. transactions.
The funds studied are identified from the VentureXpert database using the following
criteria:
a. fimd investment type is venture capital (i.e. no buyout or mezzanine funds);
b. fund nationality is U.S. We only examine U.S. funds because of their better
coverage in the VentureXpert data;
c. the fund is reported as liquidated between 1990 and 2000;
d. the fund has not made investments or IPOs after its reported liquidation;
e. necessary descriptive data for the fund is available;
f. the fund has had at least ten portfolio companies
This leaves a total of 138 U.S.-based venture capital funds. Point f. is necessary to 
ensure smoother distributions of our exit rate variables, since funds with only very few 
portfolio companies will have extreme variation in exit rates. As shown in Figure 1, the
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distribution of exit rates peaks at the 45-50% and 50-55% categories, which have an equal 
number of observations. Only four funds have exit rates below 25% and another four rates 
above 75%. No funds have exit rates below 10% or above 90%. In addition, we perform 
robustness checks where the eight outliers above are excluded and find that they do not 
drive our results.
We identify all the portfolio companies of these 138 funds through VentureXpert. 
After eliminating a few instances of double-counted companies, we have a total of 4,549 
portfolio companies whose ultimate disposition we seek to identify. We look at the IPO and 
M&A information separately and finally combine the two.
First, we use the SDC New Issues database to reveal the IPO exits for the sample flmds. We 
cross-check that the fund and portfolio company information match in both New Issues and 
VentureXpert and eluninate doubtful cases. We find 1,384 IPO matches (30% of sample 
companies).
The M&A information is more difficult to match. We first define an M&A exit as a 
transaction reported as “completed” and where control of the company is transferred. In 
other words, in the case of staged exits we only count the one transaction where the venture 
capitalist became a minority shareholder. To avoid including false exits, we also eliminate 
cases where the percentage of shares sold is not listed and the transaction is described as a 
“stake purchase”, or where the transaction is listed as taking place after fund liquidation. We 
start by using the “venture backed” flag of the M&A database, check that the fund name and 
portfolio company names match those on our list, and get 815 matches. The problem with 
the “venture backed” flag, however, is that it does not appear very reliable for older 
transactions: there are only 121 flagged transactions prior to 1989. For this reason, we 
extend our search to the whole M&A database and match portfolio companies by 
Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) numbers. More 
information on CUSIP codes is available at www.cusip.com. This provides 947 further 
matches. Finally, we look up companies from the M&A database by name and home state, 
and match 105 companies more. This brings our total of matched M&A transactions to 
1,867 (41% of sample companies).
However, some of the matches show up on both the IPO and M&A side. The most 
common case is an IPO followed by a takeover, i.e. a sale of listed equity. There are 591 
such cases in the data (13% of sample companies). In addition, in 7 cases an M&A 
transaction has been followed by a stock market listing in which the venture capitalist sold 
stock. This leaves us with 786 IPO only exits (17% of sample companies), 1,269 M&A only 
exits (28%), and 1,896 (45%) cases in which the portfolio company was liquidated or the 
outcome is otherwise unknown to us.
The Exit rate of a fund, which will be used as dependent variable in some of the 
analyses, is calculated as:
„ . Number of successful exits
Exit rate = -------------------------- -------------  (1)
Number o f portfolio companies
where successful exits are understood as IPOs, M&A transactions, or combinations thereof.
The first group of independent variables is related to compensation and incentives. 
We divide the funds into three types: independent, banking, and corporate (CVQ. 
VentureXpert divides banking fimds into smaller groups such as investment bank affiliates 
and financial corporations, but because of their small number in the sample, we group all 
banking funds under the same category.
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The fee structure of the fund in relation to portfolio companies is divided into two 
categories based on the classification in VentureXpert. This provides two categories, which 
are return on investment most important, but charges closing fees, service fees, etc., and 
return on investment is o f primary concern, does not charge fees.
The second group of independent variables relates to learning and experience. The 
funds are divided into three fund sequence types: sole, new, and follow-on funds. A fund 
can only be classified as sole or new, not both. Fund sequence number is the chronological 
number of the fund within a venture capital firm, e.g. two for the firm’s second fund. The 
classification of fund regions includes thirteen geographical areas in the U.S. Of greatest 
interest are regions locating close to finance and technology centers, defined here as greater 
Greater New York, New England, and Northern California. These three regions provide a 
dummy for favorable location.
A third group of variables includes measures of portfolio size. Firm capital under 
management describes the size of a fund’s management firm. It is the total amount of capital 
managed by all of the firm’s f\mds. Fund size is the amount of capital committed to the 
fund. Average investment is fund size divided by the number of portfolio companies. We 
use logarithmic transformations for all three size variables and use them in turns to avoid 
multicollinearity problems.
A group of variables relating to portfolio composition functions serves to control for 
stage and industry effects. Fund stage focus shows the fund’s investment strategy according 
to the stage of portfolio companies. The fund stages are divided into five categories:
Seed stage: Mainly portfolio companies that have not yet fully established 
commercial operations, and may also involve continued research and product 
development.
Early stage: Mainly companies engaged in product development, initial 
marketing, manufacturing, and sales activities.
Expansion stage: Mainly companies in the process of initial expansion (e.g. 
further plant expansion, marketing, working capital, or development of an 
improved product).
Later stage: Mainly companies needing financing for growth such as 
producing, shipping and increasing sales volume.
Balanced: Investment strategy that includes investment in portfolio 
companies at a variety of stages of development (seed, early, expansion, and 
later stage).
For the industry focus of the fund’s portfolio companies, we use a classification into 
three: information technology (IT), traditional industry, and medical (including 
biotechnology) focused funds, according to the mode type of portfolio company.
A final group of independent variables is related to fund timing. As an exogenous 
timing variable, relatively difficult for any fund manager to forecast with accuracy, we use 
the number o f IPOs in the U.S. 5 to 10 years after the founding year of the fund. 
Additionally, we define an IPO timing ratio {TR) which measures the fund’s success in 
timing its exits with the IPO market peak. It is a weighted average that indicates how large a 




IPO timing ratio = — ----------------------- (2)
Y iP O s if ) ,
/=1970
where IPOs(f)t is the number of IPO exits of the fund in year t and IPOs(m)t is the total 
number of IPOs in the U.S. in year t. As an example consider fund A which has made 6 
exits in 1986 and 1 exit in 1990. Fund B has made 5 exits in both years. The total number of 
IPOs in the U.S. is 726 in 1986 and 214 in 1990. Consequently, the IPO timing ratio is 
(6x726+lx214)/(6+l)=653 for fund A, and (5x726+5*214)/(5+5)=470 for fund B, as A’s 
exits were more concentrated on active IPO years. The IPOs(m)t are obtained from the SDC 
New Issues database.
There are two econometric problems with the IPO timing ratio variable that may 
bias results. First, the variable is recursive with respect to our dependent variables. If a fund 
has good IPO timing, it is likely to have higher exit rates by definition, and vice versa. 
Second, IPO timing may have correlations with other explanatory variables, e.g. managers 
in funds with good track records may have better timing ability.
For these two reasons, we use the number o f IPOs 5-10 years after fund founding 
variable in most specifications. We use the IPO timing ratio in a separate two-stage model 
that first removes its effect on other variables. In the first-stage regression, we create a set of 
instrumental variables for each of our model variables y, dependent or independent. These 
instrumental variables arise as residuals from a first-stage regression against an IPO timing 
ratio (TR) for each fund i:
y i ^ p { T R , ) + £ i  (3)
Fund liquidation year is the year in which the fund has distributed all its cash and possible 
remaining investments back to the limited partners. Fund founding year is the year of the 
first capital takedown. Fund lifetime is the difference of liquidation and vintage year, 
expressed in years.
rV. Empirical results
The following section presents descriptive statistics for fund types, exit types, and 
exit rates, and proceeds with an analysis of the determinants of the exit rate.
A. Descriptive statistics
Table I shows the distribution of sample fimds into various types and categories. 
Independent venture capitalists form the majority among fund types. There are only few 
corporate venture capitalists, which restricts our examination of the compensation -  
performance relation. When sorted by investment stage, more than half of the sample are 
balanced funds. Funds focusing on IT companies dominate the sample, which is to be 
expected given the fast growth of high technology in the past decades.
Table II presents further descriptive statistics on the sample funds. The average 
number of portfolio companies is found to be 33. Fund size and especially firm capital 
under management show considerable variation. The smallest firm only manages $5 million 
while the biggest has a respectful $10.9 billion under management.
Table III shows descriptive statistics of exit rates by fund type. On average, the funds 
studied manage to take public 29% of their portfolio companies. The median is slightly
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lower at 28% as the distribution is skewed to the right. This figure includes 7% of 
companies that are sold in takeovers following the listing. The average fund sells 23% of its 
portfolio companies through M&A transactions.
These results are relatively well in line with Schwienbacher’s (2002) survey. IPOs 
and sales of listed equity total 29% in our study versus 30% for Schwienbacher; M&A exits 
are 23% and 30% respectively. The proportion of write-offs or other unknown outcomes is 
higher in our study (49% vs. 33%). This is not surprising given that our long term, large 
sample methodology is bound to miss some exits due to limitations on data availability. Our 
exit figures should therefore be interpreted as conservative, especially for trade sale exits. 
We are, however, also well in line with Lemer’s (1994) figures that over the last two 
decades, 30 percent of the firms backed by venture capitalists have gone public. Over half of 
our funds have an IPO exit rate between 20% and 40%, while almost 90% of our funds fall 
between 10% and 50%.
Table IV shows the rates of the five possible outcomes against various fund types 
and shows univariate Mests for differences. Each exit rate group average (e.g. IPO only for 
independent funds) is tested against the average of that exit type for all other fimds in the 
sample. At conventional levels of significance, we notice that follow-on funds have higher 
than average IPO exit rates while new and particularly sole funds are below average in this 
respect. We also notice that IT focused funds have higher than average IPO exit rates while 
funds with a traditional industry focus place lower than average. For some groups of funds, 
such as expansion stage funds and medical focus funds, differences in exit rates seem 
marked, but statistical significance is low due to the small number of observations in those 
groups. Table V reports cross-correlations for variables used in this study.
B. Determinants of the exit rate
The determinants of the exit rate are examined in a regression fi'amework using three 
different OLS specifications and a two-stage analysis based on the IPO timing ratio. Table 
VI shows these results. Specification 1 focuses on fund background variables and 
specification 2 on investment style. Specification 3 includes all variables and specification 4 
is the second stage of a two stage analysis as described in section III. There is no need for a 
Tobit regression in this case, since there are no observations at or near the truncation points 
of 0 and 100%. Due to lack of full data for 5 funds, there are a total of 133 observations. 
The OLS r-values reported are heteroskedasticity consistent as in White (1980).
As robustness checks, we analyze subsamples excluding outliers. Outliers are 
defined as funds with an exit rate below 25% or over 75%. There are eight such cases. 
Excluding these outliers does not change our results.
Comvensation and incentives
The banking dummy has a negative and the corporate VC dummy a positive impact 
on IPO exit rate. Independent funds act as benchmark and have no dummy. The results, 
however, are not significant at conventional levels and the number of these observations is 
quite low.
Barry (1994) states that bank-affiliated venture capitalists are often more 
conservative in their strategy than independent VCs which should affect risk and return. In 
fact, the data show that five of 22 banking funds (23%) have a traditional industry focus, 
against only 14% for independent and 0% for corporate venture capitalists.
The dummy for funds charging fixed fees from portfolio companies has, as expected, 
a negative and significant coefficient. If the participation percentage under these schemes is 
in fact, lower for funds charging fees (but we have no data on this), the result supports the 
idea that funds which only rely on investment performance have a stronger exit orientation.
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Learnim and exverience
Fund sequence number has the expected positive coefficient, but is not consistently 
significant across specifications. Against a benchmark of follow-on funds, dummies for new 
fund and sole fund obtain coefficients of the expected negative sign. The sole fund dummy 
is in fact a highly significant negative determinant of the exit rate. For sole funds, there may 
be a process of natural selection going on. New funds that perform poorly make it harder for 
their managers to raise follow-on funds.
Another learning-related hypothesis investigated is that it may be easier to achieve 
successful exits in locations geographically close to a population of innovative firms and/or 
major financial centers. The favorable location dummy used gets a value of 1 for funds 
located in Northern California, New England and Greater New York and 0 otherwise. We 
find the expected positive sign but the significance of the result depends on the 
specification.
As an imreported robustness check related to learning, we perform an analysis of 
performance persistence within our sample. We take all funds which have follow-up funds, 
divide both the prior fund and the follow-up fund into three performance classes, and 
perform chi-squared tests to measure persistence. We only have 34 usable fund pairs and do 
not find results significant at conventional levels. There is, however, modest evidence of 
persistence among the funds with lower exit rates, possibly due to a similar investment 
strategy that is being followed.
We also examine whether there is performance persistence in a sequence of funds. 
Whether winners stay winners and losers stay losers has been studied especially in the 
mutual fund literature (see e.g. Carhart, 1997).
Portfolio size
The fund management firm’s log capital under management has, as expected, a 
positive effect on the exit rate. The result is statistically significant at a 1% level when all 
variables are included. The finding provides support for the hypothesis that more reputable, 
and thus larger management firms benefit from their track record and influence in terms of 
exit success.
For log fund size we find the expected positive coefficients significant at the 5% 
level when all variables are included. This provides some support for Sahlman’s (1990) idea 
that larger funds should perform better as they are able to invest in a wider universe of 
potential portfolio companies.
Portfolio composition
Dummies for seed stage, early-stage, expansion, and later stage funds act as control 
variables. Balanced funds are the benchmark for the regression. The hypothesis is that funds 
investing in later stage firms should have a higher success rate than early stage investors, as 
more is known about the company. While the seed stage dummy is negative as expected, 
and all later stages positive, the expansion stage fund dummy is the only one that comes out 
significant at conventional levels.
The dummies for traditional industry focus and medical focus have negative 
coefficients. As opposed to the univariate tests, the significance of the finding is low also for 
traditional industry focus and depends on the specification.
Timins
The variable IPOs 5-10 years from fund start is positive, as expected, fund 
lifetime negative, but neither is significant at conventional levels. As described in section III, 
we use a specific IPO timing ratio in a two-stage analysis. The first stage computed new 
instrumental variables, obtained as residuals from a regression of each variable against the 
IPO timing ratio. Second-stage results are reported in specification 4 of Table VI. The
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results are very much in line with the other specifications. This supports the idea that our 
results are robust to endogeneity caused by IPO timing ability.
V. Conclusion
This study investigates venture capital exit rates (a proxy of fund performance), the 
proportions of different exit routes, as well as fund level variables that affect exit success. 
We create a new sample of 138 U.S. venture capital funds, all liquidated between 1990 and 
2000 and all with 10 portfolio companies or more. These fimds had 4,549 portfolio 
companies. The median fund in our sample exited 19% of its portfolio companies through 
an IPO, 7% through a sale of Usted equity, and 23% through an M&A transaction, but there 
is significant variation across funds.
An empirical examination of the determinants of exit rates reveals the following 
facts. Large fund management firms have significantly higher rates of exit success, perhaps 
due to a better reputation as quality certifiers. So do larger funds, which may have a larger 
investment universe than smaller firms as described in Sahlman (1990).
Sole funds, i.e. funds that receive no follow-up have significantly lower exit rates. 
This is probably due to reverse survivorship bias: fund managers who perform badly never 
get another chance. The minority of funds which report not depending fully on investment 
performance and charging fees from portfolio companies have significantly lower exit rates. 
Finally, the stage and industry focus of the fund seem to matter less than thought, although 
expansion stage funds had larger exit rates in this sample.
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Categories of sample funds
The sample includes 138 liquidated U.S. venture capital funds that have 10 portfolio 
companies or more. Table I shows the distribution of these funds in various types. For the 






Corporate VC 3 2%







Seed stage 9 7%
Early stage 27 20%
Expansion 4 3%
Later stage 13 9%
Balanced 83 60%




Traditional industries 20 14%
NA 4 3%
Fund size ($m)
0 - 1 0 26 19%
1 0 -2 0 26 19%
2 0 - 5 0 53 38%
5 0 -1 0 0 24 17%
1 0 0 - 9 7%
NA 0 0%
Number of portfolio companies
1 0 -1 9 35 25%
2 0 - 2 9 34 25%
3 0 - 3 9 34 25%




Descriptive statistics on sample funds
Table II reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for several 
descriptive variables for 138 liquidated U.S. venture capital funds with 10 portfolio companies or 
more. Firm capital under management includes all funds managed by the same venture capital firm. 
Fund sequence number is the chronological number of the fund within a venture capital firm, e.g.
Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Number of portfolio companies 33 30 20 10 157
Firm capital under management ($m) 1,065 373 2,076 5 10,857
Fund size ($m) 36.3 25.7 38.4 1.0 284.3
Fund sequence number 2.7 2.0 2.6 1 16
Fund lifetime (years) 15.4 15.0 4.3 8.0 37




Table III shows descriptive statistics for fund exit rates (defined as [Exits in category] / 
[Number of portfolio companies]). The sample of funds includes 138 liquidated U.S. funds 
with 10 portfolio companies or more. There are five possible outcomes for each portfolio 
company: 1. IPO only; 2. Sale of listed equity (IPO followed by M&A transaction); 3. M&A 
transaction only; 4. M&A transaction followed by listing; 5. Write-off or other unknown 
outcome. Successful exits include outcomes 1 to 4. IPO exits refers to outcomes 1 and 2 
whereas M&A exits refers to outcomes 3 and 4.
Category Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
1. IPO only 21 % 19% 9% 4% 48%
2. Sale o f  listed equity (IPO then M&A) 8% 7% 7% 0% 30%
IPOs Total 29% 28% 13% 5% 78%
3. M&A only 22% 22% 9% 0% 47%
4. M&A then listing 1% 0% 2% 0% 11 %
M&A Total 23% 23% 9% 0% 47%
5. Write-off or other unknown outcome 49% 48% 14% 13% 88%
Successful exits / Portfolio companies 51 % 52% 14% 13% 87%
IPO exits (1. and 2.) / Successful exits 55% 54% 16% 14% 100%
M&A exits (3. and 4.) / Successful exits 45% 46% 16% 0% 86%
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Table IV
Exit rates by fund type
Table IV examines fund type and the proportion of five different exit outcomes for a sample 
of 138 liquidated U.S. funds with 10 portfolio companies or more. The variable shown is 
the mean of [Exits / Portfolio Companies]. Each exit rate group average (e.g. IPO only for 
independent funds) is tested against the average of that exit tjpe for all other funds in the 
sample using a two-tailed Mest. * and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.
















All Funds 20,7 8,0 21,8 0,7 48,8
Fund type
Independent 21,1 8,3 21,7 0,8 48,1
Banking 18,3 6,9 22,4 0,2 52,1
Corporate VC 22,6 9,6 20,6 0,0** 47,2
Fund sequence type
New 18,6* 8,0 21,2 0,5 51,6
Sole 12,6** 5,9 16,4 0,0** 65,1
Follow-on 22,3** 8,1 22,3 0,8 46,4*
Fund stage focus
Seed stage 19,7 4,7 24,4 1,3 49,8
Early stage 21,7 8,0 21,9 0,6 47,8
Expansion 28,1 18,8 19,2 0,5 33,3
Later stage 23,1 5,2* 21,9 0,0** 49,8
Balanced 19,8 8,4 21,6 0,7 49,5
Fund industry focus
IT 21,6* 8,7* 22,2 0,7 46,9*
Medical 23,8 7,4 18,1 0,4 50,3




Table V shows Pearson correlation coefficients between some of the key variables used. IPO 
exits include outcomes 1 and 2 and M&A exits outcomes 3 and 4 from Table III. Variables 
are defined similarly as in Table V. Statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels is 
indicated by * and ** respectively. Significance tests are two-sided.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(1) Sucessful exits / Portfolio cos 1.00**
(2) IPO exits / Successful exits 0.24** 1.00**
(3) M&A exits / Successful exits -0.24** -1.00** 1.00**
(4) Fund sequence number 0.25** 0.10 -0.10 1.00**
(5) Ln(C^. under management) 0.29** 0.20* -0.20* 0.21* 1.00**
(6) Ln(Fund size) 0.21* 0.04 -0.04 -0.10 0.27** 1.00**
(7) Ln(Average investment) 0.20* -0.01 0.01 -0.14 0.16 0.84** 1.00**
(8) IPOs 5-10 years from founding 0.10 -0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.14 0.07 0.19* 1.00**
(9) Fund lifetime -0.10 0.11 -0.11 -0.19* 0.16 -0.06 -0.24** -0.57** 1.00**
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Table VI
Determinants of [Successful exits / Portfolio companies]
Table VI shows regression results investigating the determinants of a fund’s ratio of successful exits i.e. 
[Number of successful exits / Number of portfolio companies]. A successful exit is defined as outcomes 
1 to 4 in Table III. The sample for this analysis includes 133 liquidated U.S. venture capital funds with 
10 or more portfolio companies. Five firms are eliminated from the original sample due to missing fund- 
specific data. Specifications 1 through 3 show OLS results with different sets of explanatory variables. 
Specification 1 focuses on background factors, specification 2 on investment policy variables. 
Specification 4 shows the results of the second stage of a two-stage analysis. In this second stage each 
variable y, dependent or independent, has been replaced by an instrumental variable. These instrumental 
variables arise as residuals from a first-stage regression against an IPO timing ratio (TR) for each fund /:
2000
Y\lPOs(f),>^IPOs{m),]
_  (=1970TR, =
The IPO timing ratio is a measure indicating the level of IPO activity at the time of the fund’s exits, 
where IPOs(f)t is the number of IPO exits of the fund in year t and IPOs(m)t is the total number o f IPOs 
in the U.S. in year t. The favorable location dummy includes funds based in Northern California, New 
England and Greater New York. IPO activity is a measure of the number of IPOs brought to market 
within 5 to 10 years inclusive of the fund’s founding year. Fund lifetime is the difference in years 
between the fund’s liquidation and founding years. OLS results are corrected for heteroskedasticity as in 
White (1980). Statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels is indicated by * and ** respectively. 
Significance tests are two-sided.






(4) Second-stage OLS 
on residuals after 
elimination o f  timing  
ratio effect
Dependent variable: Predicted
Successful Exits /  Portfolio Comps. sign Coefficient /-statistic Coefficient 1- statistic Coefficient f-statistic Coefficient r-statistic
Constant 32.84*» 5.11 28.31* 2.52 21.10 1.68 0.03 0.03
Compeiisatipn and incentives
Banking fund dummy - -4.36 -1.48 -1.61 -0.46 -2.79 -0.81
Corporate VC fund dummy - 4.85 0.71 9.29 1.16 8.37 1.23
Fund charges fixed fees dummy
- -7.94** -3.26 -8.83** -3.28 -8.98** -3.31
Learning and exoerience
Fund sequence number + 0.74* 1.98 0.69 1.58 0.73 1.77
N ew  fund dummy - -1.84 -0.67 -0.70 -0.25 -2.54 -0.93
Sole fund dummy - -25.82**
■10.01 -24.08** -3.84 -23.39** -3.89
Favorable location dummy + 5.59* 2.27 2.48 1.09 2.28 0.99
Portfolio size
Ln(Firm capital under management) + 1.71* 2.53 2.14** 2.88 1.96** 2.76
Ln(Fund size) + 3.07** 3.08 2.26* 2.18 2.63* 3.17
Portfolio composition
Seed stage fund dummy -
-2.68 -0.66 -1.84 -0.48 -2.43 -0.64
Early-stage fund dummy - 0.17 0.06 1.88 0.72 1.30 0.48
Expansion fund dummy + 14.16* 2.30 14.45** 2.63 14.37** 2.84
Later stage fund dummy + 1.67 0.30 1.27 0.25 1.49 0.28
Traditional industry focus dummy ? -10.42* -2.16 -5.12 -0.99 -3.59 -0.81
Medical focus dummy ? -5.01 -0.85 -2.50 -0.44 -1.95 -0.35
Timing
IPOs 5-10 years from fund start + 0.0026 1.18 0.0001 0.05
Fund lifetime 7 -0.35 -1.90 -0.40 -1.47 -0.07 -0.30
Adjusted 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.38
F-statistic 3.20** 3.07** 3.16** 5.97**
N 133 133 133 133
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Figure 1
The distribution of successful exits
Successful exits in portfolio
Figure 1 shows a histogram of the rate of successful exits, defined as [Number of successful 
exits / Number of portfolio companies]. The sample includes 138 liquidated U.S. venture 
capital funds that have 10 portfolio companies or more. The definition of successful exit 
includes four classes of exits (outcomes 1 to 4) in Table 3. These are IPO only, sale of listed 
equity, M&A transaction only, and M&A transaction followed by listing. The histogram 
classes include lower but not upper bounds.

